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This article offers a critical evaluation of Revelationism, primarily defended by Philip Goff, which asserts that introspection fully reveals the essential nature of phenomenal properties and guarantees exceptional justification of introspective judgments and beliefs. From a different viewpoint, the discussion hinges around two main axes: First, based on the conceptual and propositional nature of revelation, the aim is to refute the allegedly infallibility of Revelationism, highlighting instead its vulnerability to error, confusion, and disagreement. Second, it is argued that Revelation is insufficient to access the totality of the essential facts of phenomenal properties, focusing on aspects related to grounding, the qualitative and quantitative relationships between properties and causal dispositions. Based on these critiques, it is concluded that Revelationism does not provide a solid and plausible support for anti-physicalism.

Among the variety of cosmological arguments, the most popular is the Kalam cosmological argument, which aims to demonstrate a cause for the beginning of the universe (this cause after various reasonings, will seek to be identified with God). The peculiarity of the Kalam in contrast to other cosmological arguments, is that it depends in its premises on the finitude of the past, an issue that has been defended philosophically by offering a priori demonstrations of the impossibility of an infinite past, particularly: (i) the impossibility of a actual infinite, and (ii) the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by succesive addition. I will examine these arguments and show that they are unconvincing.

It has been argued that non-epistemic values have legitimate roles to play in the classification of psychiatric disorders. Such a value-laden view on psychiatric classification raises questions about the extent to which expert disagreements over psychiatric classification are fueled by disagreements over value judgments and the extent to which these disagreements could be resolved. This paper addresses these questions by arguing for two theses. First, a major source of disagreements about psychiatric classification is factual and concerns what social consequences a classification decision will have. This type of disagreement can be addressed by empirical research, although obtaining and evaluating relevant empirical evidence often requires interdisciplinary collaboration. Second, there is also a type of disagreement over value judgments; namely, disagreements over which aims of psychiatric classification should be prioritized. To address this type of value disagreement, it is helpful to develop a plurality of different psychiatric classification systems, each targeted toward satisfying a different subset of stakeholder aims.

In this work, I jointly take up the books on truth written by Guillermo Hurtado and Eduardo Fermandois. I focus on situating both texts within three distinct theoretical frameworks: the investigation of importance (in Frankfurt’s sense), the non-ideal theory, and the non-definitional approach. I then present both Hurtado's negative genealogy and Fermandois's conception of truth as dissent, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses, with particular attention to the proximity of both positions to a form of pragmatist-inspired expressivism.

La filosofía de la psiquiatría ha experimentado en los últimos años un crecimiento notable como ámbito de discusión, ganando notoriedad y un lugar propio como espacio de trabajo de la filosofía contemporánea. Bajo el rótulo “filosofía de la psiquiatría” se hace referencia corrientemente a un conjunto de problemas diversos, abordados mediante un conjunto heterogéneo de aproximaciones teóricas y metodológicas. Los problemas que tradicionalmente han dado forma a este campo giran en torno a preguntas conceptuales fundamentales que atañen al concepto mismo de enfermedad o trastorno mental (¿qué es la enfermedad mental?, ¿son éstas enfermedades del cerebro?, ¿se trata de clases naturales, normativas, o una combinación de ambas?, entre otras), junto a problemas que conciernen también de modo general al conjunto de la psiquiatría como práctica médica (¿cuál es la relación entre la psiquiatría y la medicina somática?, ¿qué relaciones epistémicas y normativas estructuran la relación entre terapeutas y pacientes?, entre otras) o a sus instrumentos teóricos (p. ej., ¿qué criterios son apropiados para la construcción de clasificaciones de condiciones psiquiátricas?). De modo más reciente, una cantidad significativa de trabajo filosófico se ha abocado a iluminar problemas conceptuales acerca de etiquetas diagnósticas específicas. La filosofía ha tomado un papel mucho más activo en discusiones acerca del modo en que se definen diferentes categorías nosológicas, al igual que acerca de asuntos conceptuales y metodológicos específicos que tienen un papel importante en el intento de explicar diversas condiciones particulares.

The paper discusses the Correspondence between G. W. Leibniz and Samuel Clarke. More specifically, it discusses Leibniz’s objections to Clarke’s thesis that space is a property of God and Clarke’s consequent replies. First, it explains what Clarke means by space as a ‘sequel of God’. Then, it discusses the fundamental character of Clarke’s principle according to which space is ontologically indivisible. Based on this principle, it is argued that Clarke is able to reply to two of Leibniz’s objections: that his philosophy threatens divine simplicity and that it makes God an extended Being. Furthermore, it is argued that the principle of the indivisibility of space may support an attack to René Descartes’ view according to which the finite parts of space are properties of extended bodies.

The aim of this paper is to assess Robin McKenna’s proposal of non-ideal epistemology, which he presents as the epistemological equivalent of Charles Mills’ non-ideal theory. To this end, I begin by reconstructing McKenna’s proposal. The reconstruction unfolds in three steps. First, I provide a general characterization, followed by an exploration of what the author considers to be the key aspects of his proposal, and finally, an instance of application. From there, I systematize a set of criticisms that question whether this proposal maintains a meaningful continuity with Mills’ non-ideal theory. Finally, I introduce the work of Heidi Grasswick, which provides a relevant point of contrast for the discussion on non-ideal epistemology.

Traditionally, the problem of evil revolves around the issue of reconciling the coexistence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God and evil. In response to this threat, philosophers use a generalized and abstract concept of evil to build a stronger argument against it. In this article, I challenge this method and advocate a practical approach to the problem of evil, emphasizing the importance of studying the concept of evil through concrete examples of its manifestations. I propose studying the latest from an embodied (phenomenological) perspective. Evil becomes a case of lived embodied experience that religion can help deal with. Thus, by introducing the concept of the body in the middle of the traditional Trilemma, I shift the questions toward the coexistence and interrelation of three separate subjects: God, Evil, and Human Agency. Such an embodied perspective offers a new look at the concept of evil, taking it out of a strictly abstract intellectual problematic circle and opening a possibility of methodological expansion and further interdisciplinary studies of the question.

Numerous studies have highlighted the importance of metaphors in Darwin’s theory, emphasizing their role not only as rhetorical devices but also as conceptual tools essential to the development of his thought. This article supports this view and highlights the complex and multifaceted functions of metaphors in Darwin’s work. However, the primary aim of this study is not to reiterate this importance but to demonstrate that Darwin employed his metaphors consciously and reflectively, critically assessing their utility and limitations. Additionally, the article explores how Darwin defended these figures against the criticisms and misunderstandings of his time, presenting arguments that showcase his deep understanding of the conceptual and epistemological dimensions of metaphorical language in scientific knowledge construction.