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In several academic studies, Pablo Melogno lays the groundwork for formulating election rational criteria between incommensurable theories, seeking to reconcile the Kuhnian notion of incommensurability with rationalist reconstructions of the processes of theoretical change. One of the axes of this project focuses on the semantic aspects of incommensurability, particularly the development of historical semantics that relativizes the scope of semantic holism. In this analysis, I deepen and extend Melogno’s project by considering various aspects of hybrid theories of reference.

In this article, I will use terms such as “responsive” and “responsivity”, that became indispensable for my own thinking when I tried to develop a theory of radical Fremdheit. In this article I develop the basic features of this responsivity in which others are involved. Methodologically, I am guided by a variant of responsive phenomenology that is to be understood as a phenomenology grounded in the body. Crucial to this is the descent into a radical form of experience that precedes all constructs and models, as well as its own theory.

This article discusses Benjamin's interpretation of Baudelaire's poetry as a key to reading modernity. Understanding the ambiguities between novelty and archaism, typical of the time, is only possible thanks to the poet’s gesture of privileging radical contingency. On the one hand, the violence of unwanted encounters amid the crowd does not allow for reflection; on the other, its productive dimension makes contingency speakable. The poet’s verses will make possible the encounter of the now of experience with the available past in terms of expectation: explanatory images are produced from the singularity of language. Finally, the Lacanian real is produced thanks to the understanding of the psyche as structure.

As this paper coincides with the first anniversary of Pablo Melognos passing, it delves into his profound contributions as a distinguished philosopher of science to the field of science education. Focused on his unique perspective shaped by an extensive exploration of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy, the paper aims to elucidate Melogno’s distinctive insights into science education. The methodology employed involves a theoretical and exploratory analysis of Melogno’s limited but qualitatively rich works on science education. Melogno’s perspective on science education emerges in a deep engagement with Kuhn’s philosophy. Despite shifts in his assessment of Kuhn’s ideas, Melogno’s core vision about science education remains steadfast throughout all his texts. By advocating a holistic understanding of the history of science, Melogno emphasizes the importance of cultivating critical thinking skills in students, while not forgetting to teach scientific concepts, methods, and theories. His stance rejects the notion of total ruptures in scientific paradigms as a way to avoid indoctrination. Furthermore, the paper proposes investigations into the relationship between Melogno’s defense of partial ruptures, fostering a more nuanced historical perspective and promoting critical thinking in science education. In essence, Melogno’s legacy extends beyond the footsteps of Kuhn, as he carved his own philosophical path, leaving indelible marks on the landscape of scientific thought.

Thanks to his meticulous archaeological analysis of Kuhn's unpublished works, Pablo Melogno's thought has profoundly influenced scholars of Kuhnian philosophy in Latin America. From this analysis, he aims to unveil the semantic commitments of the author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Among the abundant literature that Melogno leaves us as an intellectual legacy, one work stands out not only for its rigor but also for the provocative nature of its arguments. I refer to “Towards a Genealogy of Thomas Kuhn’s Semantics” (2023), co-authored with Giri. In this work, the authors argue that in his early texts, Kuhn defends a semantic commitment to the descriptive theory of the cluster. Since I believe this is an inflationary interpretation, I will propose a deflationary interpretation in this article. I argue that, while Kuhn may have anticipated some of the claims of the cluster theory, the true purpose of the Lowell Lectures has a destructive semantic character, focusing on formal—or prescriptive—theories of meaning.  

Is it epistemically vicious to be attached to a specific scientific paradigm? Such attachment clearly violates a norm of impartiality that is associated with the value-free ideal of science. I will argue that what Samuel Scheffler (2022) calls ‘evaluative attachment’ is not always epistemically vicious. In section 1, I will present Kuhn’s account of paradigms as embodying not just theoretical positions but also a ‘constellation of group commitments’, that Kuhn came to call a ‘disciplinary matrix’ (2012/1962, postscript). Section 2 evaluates Popper’s and Davidson’s criticisms of Kuhn, drawing on the work of Pablo Melogno (2020). Section 3 evaluates the claim that impartiality is a significant source of the value we accord to science. Section 4 appeals to Samuel Scheffler’s (2022) concept of evaluative attachment to argue that partiality to a specific framework or paradigm is not an epistemic vice. I conclude with brief observations, to be elaborated in future work, on how this argument applies to science in particular.

In The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research (1979), Thomas Kuhn emphasizes the need for mature sciences to train their human resources by promoting a strong adherence to the ontological and epistemological foundations that support their paradigmatic conception. This strong thesis, which somehow removes perspective from scientists, raises the question of how such strong dogmatic adherence allows criticism and, ultimately, the scientific revolution. In “Normal Science, Dogmatism and Progress” (2023), Pablo Melogno critically reviews this Kuhnian proposal and several analyses of his work. He concludes that Kuhn's proposal is accurate in that he contemplates how the tension between conservation and criticism allows, in certain circumstances, to sustain the strong built-in adhesion and, in other circumstances, to exercise informed criticism in the face of an overwhelming accumulation of anomalies. In this paper, I suggest that not only rational factors lead a group to decide on continuity or paradigmatic change but also cultural and ideological factors, often naturalized and difficult to objectify.

Information science has tried to consolidate its scientific status on the basis of Kuhnian conceptions of science. Thus, the notion of paradigm is central to analyze its epistemological problems. Several authors have postulated different paradigms for the area, with the understanding that the attainment of a paradigm will allow its consolidation and unification. The main developments of paradigms within the discipline are analyzed, as well as other elements of the Kuhnian perspective. A critical review of the application of the notions present in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to the epistemological and historical reconstruction of the field is made. It is concluded that the Kuhnian philosophy provides propositional elements when thinking about epistemological problems, since the ability to articulate and generate consensus is found in the community and the assumption of a successful tradition of problem solving.

The objective of this work is to show that the cognitive and ontological connections between Benjamin’s and Zambrano’s works, more than similarities and differences, are based on the exercise of their expressive action. Along with the image that appears in the writing, both thinkers cite old poetic forms, which allows them to update philosophical, political and theological figurations to configure an experience of thinking in work.

This paper discusses seven of Melogno’s papers on Kuhn from 2019 to 2024. It analyzes Melogno’s arguments about the relationship between Kuhn’s early and late historiography, his rejection of the discovery-justification distinction, and his move towards questions of meaning and semantics in the 1980s. This paper argues that Melogno made vital contributions to “Kuhn studies,” carefully tracing developments in Kuhn’s thought over time. However, it also engages critically with some of Melogno’s central claims, like his argument that The Structure of Scientific Revolutions represented a sharp break from Kuhn’s earlier historiographical work. Overall, the paper concludes that Melogno’s research significantly advanced understanding of Kuhn’s philosophy and deserves to influence future scholarships on Kuhn substantially.